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Abstract: The article identifies the discursive characteristics of news media 
texts covering Poland’s ‘constitutional crisis’. Following the conception of 
discourse presented in Laclau and Mouffe (1985), i.e. as an articulatory 
practice that conveys meaning through a structured system of positions and 
differences, the article highlights some features of English-language news 
media texts (e.g. from the Guardian, Telegraph, Economist, Financial Times, 
New York Times, Washington Post) that can be described as typical. The 
following features are identified: a lecturing tone, the use of structural 
oppositions, immediate rebuttals, misrepresentation, appeals to expertise, and 
the sovereignty taboo. These features are diagnosed as contributing to the 
narrow discursive range covered by news articles. To shed light on this narrow 
range, the article presents three conflicting positions from Polish legal theory 
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that address the issues of constitutional courts, the rule of law and national 
sovereignty: Ryszard Piotrowki’s legal constitutionalism, Paweł Bała and 
Adam Wielomski’s Schmitt-inspired position, and Adam Sulikowski’s reading 
of the constitutional courts as an instrument of hegemonic discourse. In the 
conclusion it is suggested that news media discourse would benefit from 
demonstrating a greater awareness of other discourses, and from developing a 
more generous, balanced approach to presenting and addressing their claims. 
 
Keywords: discourse analysis; news media articles; the Polish constitutional 
crisis; rule of law; sovereignty; legal theory. 
 
ANALIZA DYSKURSYWNA PUBLIKACJI PRASOWYCH 
DOTYCZĄCYCH „KRYZYSU PRAWORZĄDNOŚCI” W POLSCE 
 
Abstrakt: W artykule wskazano charakterystyczne cechy dyskursu publikacji 
prasowych poświęconych „kryzysowi konstytucyjnemu” w Polsce. Bazując 
na koncepcji dyskursu autorstwa Laclaua i Mouffe (1985), zgodnie z którą jest 
to praktyka artykulacyjna wyrażająca znaczenie poprzez ustrukturyzowany 
system pozycji i różnic, zwrócono uwagę na pewne typowe cechy tekstów 
publikowanych w prasie anglojęzycznej (np. w The Guardian, Telegraph, 
Economist, Financial Times, New York Times, Washington Post). Są to: 
pouczający ton, wykorzystanie strukturalnych przeciwieństw, natychmiastowe 
odpieranie zarzutów, przeinaczanie, odwoływanie się do wiedzy eksperckiej 
oraz swoistego tabu suwerenności. Wykazano, że cechy te przyczyniają 
się do zawężania zakresu dyskursu tychże publikacji. Następnie, celem 
wskazania zakresu zawężenia anglojęzycznego dyskursu prasowego, artykuł 
zwięźle przedstawia trzy odmienne stanowiska z obszaru polskiej teorii prawa. 
Podejmują one kwestie sądów konstytucyjnych, praworządności 
i suwerenności narodowej. Stanowiska te to konstytucjonalizm prawny 
Ryszarda Piotrowskiego, podejście Pawła Bały i Adama Wielomskiego, 
zainspirowanych teorią Schmitta, oraz interpretacja Adama Sulikowskiego, 
w myśl której sądy konstytucyjne są instrumentami dyskursu 
hegemonicznego. We wnioskach zasygnalizowano, że dyskurs publikacji 
prasowych istotnie skorzystałby na uwzględnieniu innych dyskursów oraz 
rozwinięciu bogatszego i bardziej zrównoważonego podejścia do sposobu, 
w jaki prezentuje i odnosi się do zawartych w nich stwierdzeń. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: analiza dyskursu; dyskurs prasowy; kryzys konstytucyjny 
w Polsce; praworządność; suwerenność; teoria prawa. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The issue 
Over the course of 5 years, Poland’s ‘rule of law crisis’ or 
‘constitutional crisis’, as it is referred to in English news media and 
scholarship,1 has become immensely complex and deeply divisive. The 
crisis essentially concerns the steps taken by the Polish government and 
President, after the Law and Justice Party came to power in October 
2015, with regard to the judicial power (the Constitutional Tribunal, the 
Supreme Court, the ordinary courts and the National Council of the 
Judiciary), which has taken the form of appointments, mandatory 
retirements and legislation on structure and organisation. The conflict 
boils down to the constitutionality of the government’s legislation and 
president’s actions, and whether the principles of the separation of 
powers and judicial independence have been breached. The crisis 
became an EU issue when the European Commission acted to “defend 
judicial independence” in December 2017 (European Commission 
2017), and with the EU Court of Justice ruling in January 2020 that 
Poland had failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law. 
From the outset, the crisis has been extensively covered in UK 
and US publications representing positions across the political 
spectrum. Coverage has persisted through Covid-19 pandemic, with 
reference being made to the crisis in editorials in the Guardian and 
Telegraph on Poland’s presidential election of May-July 2020,2 and 
then in commentary on the ‘abortion ban’ of October 2020.3  
In UK and US news sources, the Polish ‘rule of law crisis’ is 
treated as symptomatic of more general trends, with Poland frequently 
being positioned as further along the lurch into illiberalism and 
authoritarianism. In US publications, the purpose of the focus on Poland 
is often to warn and trigger reflection, as in Anne Applebaum’s piece 
 
1 For a scholarly account of the crisis, see Bunikowski (2018). 
2 See ‘The Guardian view on Poland’s presidential election: call it off’ Guardian 
05.05.2020, and ‘Poland’s Law and Justice party needs to start living up to its name’ 
Telegraph 12.07.2020. 
3 Author’s note: the furore surrounding Contitutional Tribunal’s ruling on abortion 
erupted after this article was submitted for review, therefore newspaper articles 
covering this issue fall outside the scope of the present work. 
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for the October 2018 issue of The Atlantic, ‘A Warning from Europe: 
The Worst is Yet to Come’. In UK newspapers, the Polish crisis has 
been leveraged to bolster positions and push agendas on Brexit – prior 
to the Covid-19 pandemic perhaps the most polarizing issue in UK 
media discourse. Two articles – one from The Guardian, the other from 
The Telegraph, and thus from newspapers supposedly at the opposite 
ends of the political spectrum – exemplify this tendency. 
In February 2019, in an opinion piece for the UK’s pro-Brexit 
Telegraph, Damien Phillips, a conservative public affairs consultant,4 
argued ‘A no-deal Brexit is our safest option to escape the EU police 
state – let's go for it’. To support the description of the EU as a police 
state, the author provides details on a surveillance scandal in Romania, 
alleging that the EU has shown “wilful blindness” to this issue. For 
further evidence, Phillips then details the “abuses of power” of two EU 
member states – Hungary and Poland: 
Meanwhile, in Hungary, we see ever more centralisation of power and 
authority, with judges being forcibly retired in large numbers, political 
figures given greater control of the judiciary and even the establishment 
of courts overseen directly by government. In Poland, the state has 
clamped down on the judiciary, press and civil rights – in violation of 
its constitution and Polish law. Independent courts and mutual 
recognition of legal decisions between member states are central to the 
operation of EU law and the single market, prompting legal analysts to 
declare Hungary and Poland as posing a far worse threat to the EU than 
Brexit (Phillips 2019). 
Thus, the UK’s exit from the EU without a trade deal is justified 
because: a) the EU is becoming “ever more centralised”; and yet, b) its 
“ostensibly rules-based order” is being challenged and undermined by 
the authoritarian tendencies of certain member states. The EU is thereby 
cast as a centralised police state, but also one which refuses “to face up 
to the peril of a steady collapse in the rule of law in many of its 
member states” (Phillips 2019) (emphasis added). 
Over a year later, in March 2020, the Warsaw-based Annabelle 
Chapman5 wrote a report-opinion piece for the pro-EU Guardian, 
arguing that ‘Poland’s leadership doesn’t need “Polexit” – it can 
undermine the EU from within’. Like Phillips, Chapman pairs Poland 
 
4 See Phillips’ articles for ConservativeHome and his Twitter activity. 
5 See Chapman’s Twitter for links to her articles in The Economist and other 
publications. 
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with Hungary and asserts that Poland’s Law and Justice party (PiS) is 
undermining the rule of law in the EU through its dealings with the 
judiciary: 
Poland has been locked in a protracted conflict with EU institutions 
over its judicial changes, which the European commission has 
warned undermine the rule of law. Together with Hungary’s prime 
minister, Viktor Orbán, PiS has challenged the idea that liberal 
democracy is the only game in town and normalised values typically 
associated with the far right, including disbanding a government body 
that dealt with racism and xenophobia and championing homophobia.  
But the most substantial threat to the EU comes from PiS’s capture of 
the judiciary. […] If they remain unaddressed, the Polish government’s 
judicial changes could have a wider impact on the rule of law in 
Poland and the EU (Chapman 2020, emphasis added). 
The point to be addressed here is how two journalists, writing from 
opposite positions on the currently most defining and divisive issue in 
UK politics, could at the same time adopt nearly identical positions on 
Poland’s ‘rule of law crisis’. In other words, even if their agendas 
concerning the EU are opposed, the authors are nevertheless united in 
their descriptions of the steps taken by the Polish government in its 
dealings with the judiciary. Their consensus is that the Polish 
government is undermining the rule of law in Poland and the EU; and 
that PiS poses a broad threat to liberal democracy in Europe. In neither 
text is any effort made to explore the motivations and justifications for 
PiS’s reforms of the judiciary; neither is any attempt made to investigate 
PiS’s ostensible challenge to liberal democracy: Chapman 
acknowledges there may be another “game in town”, but reduces it to 
the irrational fears of xenophobia and homophobia. 
In terms of discourse theory, both journalists can be viewed as 
occupying positions in the same discourse, and then, more broadly, in 
the same discursive formation.  
1.2. Definitions and assumptions 
For the purposes of this article, discourse is defined, following (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985), as an articulatory practice that constitutes a 
meaning-system constructed through “a differential and structured 
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system of positions” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 105), and a discursive 
formation can be identified if “certain regularities establish differential 
positions” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 109). 
The articulatory practice of writing genre-typical newspaper 
texts draws on a structured system of contingently fixated meanings, 
naturalized categories and relational identities to constitute subject 
positions within a broader field of “discursive struggle” (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002: 6). If certain regularities (textual features, strategies) are 
observed to permeate across genres – in this case newspaper articles 
and editorials, scholarly legal theory and normative texts (constitutions, 
treaties and legal rulings) – then such regularities can be identified as 
belonging to a discursive formation: a complex of intertextual 
articulatory practices and material institutions.  
Unlike Foucault (1972) and Fairclough (1992), Laclau and 
Mouffe do not distinguish between discursive and non-discursive 
practices (1985: 107-109): they treat discourse as having a material 
aspect, in the sense that parliaments, courts, prisons, a judge’s role and 
position, lawyers’ offices, legal costs etc., are all part of legal discourse, 
just as much as textual phenomena (constitutions, bills, amendments, 
theoretical texts, newspaper articles), since they are structured by 
systems of signification and meaning. 
Lastly, and most importantly, in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory, the existence of a discourse is grounded in antagonism: a 
discourse attempts “to dominate the field discursivity” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 112), and articulatory practices confront each other “in a 
field criss-crossed by antagonisms”, from which hegemony emerges 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 114, 134). Just as they view identities as 
being constructed relationally, through differential subject positionings, 
the same goes for discourses and discourse formations: they require a 
frontier and something “beyond them”, an exteriority, in order to 
constitute themselves as a totality (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 143). In 
other words, a discourse (e.g. legal constitutionalism) or a discursive 
formation (e.g. the liberal-democratic legal order) can only constitute 
and define itself by the antagonistic suppression (negative definition, 
misrepresentation) of that which they are not (e.g. populism). 
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1.3. Methodology 
As Fairclough (1992: 57) and Jorgensen and Phillips (2002: 49) 
observe, the broad, macro-level approaches of Foucault and of Laclau 
and Mouffe do not provide examples of, or tools for, detailed text 
analysis. Thus, while the present article is grounded in the philosophical 
conception of discourse developed by Laclau and Mouffe, the 
methodology for the detailed analysis of news media articles draws on 
the insights and approaches of Fairclough (1992, 1995) and van Dijk 
(2009, 2014). 
For Fairclough, discourse analysis is necessarily “a 
multidisciplinary activity” (1992: 74), since it oscillates between the 
descriptive analysis of textual properties and the interpretation of texts 
produced and consumed as a part of social practice. While textual 
properties can be analysed with the tools of linguistics, in particular 
those provided by Halliday’s functional approach (2003, 2014), the 
tools of sociology are necessary for interpreting the socio-cognitive 
process involved in text production and consumption, particularly with 
regard to how this practice is shaped by and construct meaning through 
interpretation (Fairclough 1992: 71-75).  
Fairclough’s multidisciplinary approach is extended by van 
Dijk (2014), who argues that, since discourse shapes the knowledge 
acquired and continually updated by espistemic communities, discourse 
studies should draw on the various disciplines that account for 
knowledge production and consumption. For van Dijk, “discourse 
analysis is not a method but a cross-discipline”; hence, in addition to 
sociology, it can employ the methods of psychology, anthropology, 
communication studies, linguistics, semiotics etc., in order to shed light 
on the “knowledge-discourse interface” (van Dijk 2014: 7-12). 
With this in mind, Section 2 of this article adopts a genre-based 
approach to the discourse analysis of news texts covering Poland’s 
‘constitutional crisis’. The analysis is restricted to broadsheet and 
weeklies, for the simple reason that tabloid newspapers have not 
covered this issue with any regularity.6 Texts which address this issue 
 
6 When tabloid newspapers (e.g. The Sun, The Mirror and New York Post) cover Poland, 
the articles tend to focus on other issues (migration, abortion, broader conflict with the 
EU). For example, The Sun mentioned the Constitutional Tribunal following the 
October ‘abortion ban’. See: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/13005047/poland-ban-
abortions-clashes-cops-warsaw/  
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are assigned to three main types: reports, editorials/opinion pieces, and 
blends of reports and opinion pieces. These text types are treated as 
constituting a system of genres, in their configuration and relationships 
(Fairclough 1992: 126). The texts thus assigned are then analysed to 
identify genre-typical features. A feature is treated as potentially typical 
if it appears in several texts and in different publications, thereby 
suggesting its systemic nature.  
The method of textual analysis employed here is both 
descriptive, e.g. when focusing on the use of adjectives and modality, 
and interpretative, e.g. when highlighting the use of strategies, such as 
appeals to expertise, immediate rebuttals etc. It is assumed, following 
Fairclough, that texts are produced and consumed by social agents 
thorugh socio-cognitive processes that are largely unconscious: writers 
employ strategies to convey meaning, and readers construct meaning 
through interpretation (Fairclough 1992: 71-2; 1995: 233). The 
consideration of such strategies necessarily entails moving from the 
description of textual elements to interpretation of the factors that 
determine textual production. 
Section 3 presents three conflicting positions from Polish legal 
theory that address the issues covered or suppressed by the articles 
analyzed in Section 2. The purpose in this section is not to analyse these 
theoretical texts in terms of genre features, but rather – following 
Fairclough and van Dijk’s multi- and interdisciplinary discourse studies 
– to analyse the texts using the key tool from the discipline of 
philosophy, i.e. the analysis of concepts. The aim is to juxtapose 
divergent conceptions of the constutional judiciary, the rule of law, and 
sovereignty, which are currently the subject of much debate in Polish 
legal theory, with a view to shedding light on the narrow conceptual 
range found in the articles analysed in Section 2.  
While it is simply impossible for a researcher to adopt a 
privileged standpoint outside of discourse per se (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002: 21), a researcher can consider the relationship and 
interaction between discourses, such as news media and legal theory, 
and analyse how a concept is presented and treated in both. 
Thus, to return to the articles of Phillips and Chapman, despite 
the fact they articulate divergent subject positions from within the 
opposed corporate-subject positions of the Guardian and the 
Telegraph, they can be seen as deploying the same “naturalised 
categories” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 21-26) to organize their 
statements and texts in similar ways. For example, in both articles, ‘the 
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rule of law’ is invoked as a common-sense, taken-for-granted category: 
it is not explicated or contextualized to any extent. Chapman (2020) 
merely describes the rule of law as one of the EU’s “fundamental 
values” and refers the reader via a hyperlink to the European 
Commission’s Rule of Law webpage;7 elucidation is thereby 
outsourced to the experts. In turn, Phillips contrasts the “rules-based 
order” of the EU, characterised as centralized and tyrannical, with the 
UK’s “liberty under the law”. It is possible that Phillips’ distinction 
alludes to deeper differences between continental law and the UK’s 
common law, but the juxtaposition is not clarified or developed, and 
remains purely rhetorical. For example, a Brexiteer could argue that the 
UK’s common law principle of ‘rule of law’, based on a balance 
between parliamentary sovereignty and ‘judge-made law’ whereby 
legislation is applied in accordance with an open, evolving, unwritten 
constitution (Santoro 2007: 153-200), is fundamentally incompatible 
continental concepts of ‘rule of law’ (Etat de droit, Rechtsstaat and 
praworządność), which are based on the supremacy of closed 
constitutions and the control of constitutional courts. Yet Phillips makes 
no such argument.  
With these Guardian and Telegraph articles, the lack of 
elucidation can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Perhaps the authors 
assume their readers have sufficient knowledge of what the ‘the rule of 
law’ is, and thus do not require a dumbed-down explanation. Or perhaps 
the meaning of this concept is – deliberately or unconsciously – swept 
under the carpet, so the expression can function as an empty signifier, 
thus foreclosing reflection and discouraging deeper analysis on the part 
of the reader.  
 
7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-
law/rule-law_en 
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2. Generic features of news media texts on Poland’s 
‘constitutional crisis’ 
2.1. Text types: the reporting/commenting continuum  
UK and US news texts covering Poland’s ‘constitutional crisis’ can be 
viewed as occupying a continuum ranging from relatively neutral 
reports of events to overt commentary in the form of editorials and 
opinion pieces. In between these two text types there are increasingly 
common blends of reporting and commenting. 
2.1.1. Reports 
Texts which can be placed on the reporting end of the continuum can 
firstly be distinguished by what they do not do. This negative definition 
is exemplified in in the language used to describe the chief actors. Thus 
in the BBC articles ‘Poland reverses law on removing judges following 
EU court ruling’, 21.11.2018, and ‘Retirement age: Poland broke EU 
law with ruling on judges’, 5.11.2019, the descriptions of the Polish 
government avoid the adjectives ‘right-wing’, ‘populist’ and 
‘nationalist’, which are typical of opinion pieces; instead the following 
terms are used: “Poland's governing party”, “the government”, “The 
Law and Justice Party (PiS)”, “the PiS”.  
The most descriptive premodification appears in the noun 
phrase “Poland’s socially conservative government” (5.11.2019). I 
would argue that this is a more neutral premodification than ‘rightwing 
populist’ or ‘nationalist’, as the description signals there are different 
types of conservatism, and thus has an informative function, rather than 
a trigger function. 
Other actors are described as follows: “the head of the PiS, 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski”, “the Supreme Court chief justice, Professor 
Malgorzata Gersdorf”; whereas in opinion pieces and blends the same 
actors are described as “rightwing firebrand Jaroslaw Kaczynski” 
(Shotter and Majos 2019) and “the independent-minded Supreme Court 
president” (The Economist 2020).  
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Another genre-typical feature of such reports is the attempt to 
include the multiple viewpoints, through a mixture of direct and indirect 
speech, without commenting on the perspectives or developments. 
Thus, despite the dramatic headline of the Express article ‘Brussels 
fury: Poland could be KICKED OUT of EU over controversial 
reforms’, 19.12.2019, the actual text refrains from commenting, and 
attempts to present the varied perspectives of PiS representatives, the 
Court of Justice of the EU, protesters etc. The only opinions that the 
author offers concern probability (“the legislation is likely to pass”) 
(Mowat 2019).8  
2.1.2. Editorials/opinion pieces  
Editorials on Poland’s ‘constitutional crisis’ have appeared in the pages 
of the Financial Times and The Guardian. One of the typical features 
of this text type is the lecturing, paternalistic tone adopted, and the 
extensive use of modality to comment on what certain actors should do 
or should refrain from doing.  
For instance, in the Financial Times article ‘Poland must not 
slide further into illiberalism’, 16.10.2019, the editorial team offers the 
following advice: “Law and Justice would do better to build on its 
popularity while trying to heal the country’s divisions” (emphasis 
added). In the article ‘In Poland, the rule of law is under ever greater 
threat’, 09.02.2020, the team advises the Polish government: “If the 
Polish government’s real aim is to provide more effective justice, it 
would do better to backtrack” (emphasis added); and EU states: 
“Above all, EU states should not shrink from linking future 
disbursement of lucrative structural funds to upholding the rule of law” 
(emphasis added).  
Similarly, the Guardian editorial ‘The Guardian view on 
Poland’s presidential election: call it off’, 05.05.2020, which connects 
the Presidential election to Law and Justice “playing fast and loose with 
democratic norms, particularly in relation to the judiciary and media”, 
concludes that the election should be called off, stating: “On legal, 
 
8 For a similar range of viewpoints, see the Agence France-Presse article published in 
the Telegraph on 4.7.2018, ‘Polish Supreme Court chief justice turns up to work in 
defiance of retirement law being challenged by EU’ 
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logistical and ethical grounds that would be the right course of action” 
(emphasis added).9  
This paternalistic lecturing is grist to the mill for nationalist-
oriented assertions that the institutions of Western Europe – such as the 
EU, the Court of Justice of the European Union, multinationals and, of 
course ‘Western media’ – are tools of colonialism.10 The fact that the 
editorial boards of UK newspapers take it upon themselves to tell Polish 
political parties and EU states what course of action they should take 
does seem to testify to the presence of an entitled mindset; one that 
presumes its Central European addressees will pay heed. 
2.1.3. Blends of factual news reports and opinion pieces  
The paternalistic, lecturing tone is also distinctive textual feature typical 
for blends of reports and commentary. Such texts also employ a range 
of other strategies which, due to their regularity, can be identified as 
genre-typical features. 
The first is mixing verifiable facts with value-laden language 
designed to trigger associations and emotions. A case in point is Marc 
Santora’s article ‘Polish Crisis Deepens as Judges Condemn Their Own 
Court’ for the New York Times, 05.07.2018, which opens as follows:  
For days, tens of thousands of Poles have marched in the streets 
to protest their nationalist government’s purge of the Supreme 
Court, an action that has been condemned by the European 
Union as a threat to the rule of law in a country that led the 
struggle against Soviet domination in 1989 (Santora 2018). 
 
9 It would be worth exploring whether this lecturing tone is unique to ‘Western’ 
newspapers commenting on Poland. Preliminary research on Polish articles 
commenting on, for example, Brexit or Boris Johnson’s clashes with the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom (i.e. the UK’s own ‘constitutional crisis’) suggest that Polish 
dailies and weeklies do not take it upon themselves to lecture the UK. For instance, see 
“Sąd Najwyższy ratuje honor brytyjskiej demokracji. Co dalej z brexitem? [The 
Supreme Court saves the honour of British democracy. What’s next for Brexit?]”, 
Polityka 24.09.2019 (Skarżyński 2019); and “Brexit - lekcja dla Polski [Brexit – a 
lesson for Poland]” Gazeta Wyborcza 31.01.2020 (Michnik 2020). 
10 See, for example, Ferenc Almassy’s article “Eastern Europeans Begin to Grow Tired 
of Western Colonialism” (Almassy 2017). 
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In the midst of statements of identifiable and verifiable facts (a 
large number of Poles marched in protest; the Polish government’s 
actions were criticized by the EU) there are some statements that are 
more problematic. First, the description of a government as 
“nationalist” has negative connotations in this context, since the article 
is structured around a network of positive and negative actors, with “the 
European Union” being the positive counterpart to the Polish 
government. Second, the description of the government’s action as a 
“purge” is neither informative nor neutral: the reader is not given any 
information – at this point – on what exactly the government has done 
to the Supreme Court; and when the term ‘purge’ is deployed shortly 
before the reference to Soviet domination in the final clause, the Polish 
government is thereby implicitly compared with the Soviet Union, 
which readers with even basic knowledge of communism will associate 
with Stalinist purges. This comparison is echoed in third paragraph, 
where Poland is described as “a nation that once represented post-
communist hopes for democracy but that is now under the grip of an 
increasingly authoritarian – though legitimately elected – government” 
(Santora 2018). Again, and somewhat obviously, the adjective 
“authoritarian” is deployed as the negative term, contrasted with 
“democracy”. 
The article also exemplifies another key strategy typical for this 
genre of texts on the Polish crisis: namely the presentation of a token 
argument which is immediately refuted by a counter argument (often 
drawing on anonymous, ‘expert’ sources), as can be seen in the 
following section: 
The government says the reforms are all intended to make the courts 
more responsive to the will of the people – and to free the judiciary from 
corrupt judges or communist-era holdovers. But critics see the end of 
the judiciary’s functioning as a check on power – and a violation of the 
liberal democratic norms that are required of members of the European 
Union, which Poland joined in 2004” (Santora 2018, emphasis added). 
In an article consisting of 1,777 words, a total of 31 words are devoted 
to the government’s justification of its actions11 – which is instantly 
subjected to a rebuttal (“But critics see…”) that does not in fact respond 
 
11 A further 71 words are devoted to Zbigniew Ziobro’s comments on the jurisdiction 
and competent of Court of Justice of the European Union, which appear at the end of 
the article and upon which no comment is made. 
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to the government’s reported claims (i.e. the courts need to be more 
responsive; the judiciary is corrupt), but instead resorts to hyperbole 
(“the end of the judiciary’s functioning”). 
This strategy of immediate rebuttal is employed in the 
Washington Post article ‘If you think the U.S. is having a constitutional 
crisis, you should see what is happening in Poland’, 25.01.2020, but 
here, while Polish government sources are anonymous and the 
argument is summarized in reported speech, the rebuttal is clearly 
weighted towards the expertise and authority of Koen Lenaerts, whose 
argument is quoted directly: 
PiS authorities argue that this is an instance of unwarranted European 
Union interference in domestic affairs. However, the European Union 
relies on cooperation between national and European courts, and E.U. 
membership requires respect for the rule of law, including judicial 
independence. As Koen Lenaerts, president of the European Court 
of Justice (the European Union’s highest court), put it earlier this 
month in a debate at Warsaw University: ‘You can’t be a member of 
the European Union if you don’t have independent, impartial courts 
operating in accordance with fair trial rule, upholding Union law’” 
(Pech and Kelemen 2020) (emphasis added). 
Similar immediate rebuttals and tactical appeals to expertise can be 
found in the Financial Times article ‘Poland’s clash over justice system 
leaves courts in chaos’ 24.01.2020, which cites five words of Zbigniew 
Ziobro, Poland’s justice minister, and reports government sources 
anonymously (“Law and Justice argues …”), while including a lengthy 
direct quotation from “Marcin Matczak, a law professor at the 
University of Warsaw”, and concluding the article by citing “Christian 
Wigand, a spokesman for the commission…” (Shotter 2020).12  
 
12 That the use of such textual tactics is not inevitable when covering Polish 
controversies is demonstrated by reports that address broader social and political issues 
(in addition to the ‘constitutional crisis’), such as the Times article ‘Inflamed Poland 
scorns Brussels’, 06.08.2017 (Pancevski 2017), and the Financial Times article ‘Poland 
election: the unfinished counter-revolution’, 09.10.2019 (Shotter and Majos 2019). 
These reports – while still resorting to genre-typical dramatic phrases (“waging an 
unprecedented all-out war”, “the PiS-loathing urban elite” (Pancevski 2017), 
“rightwing firebrand Jaroslaw Kaczynski” (Shotter and Majos 2019)) – can be 
described as reasonably balanced: multiple points of view are presented, with the use 
of direct quotations; and commentary is either kept to a minimum or is extrapolated 
from the interviewees’ words.  
 
Comparative Legilinguistics 44/2020 
19 
2.2. Implicit oppositions 
As has been mentioned, the discourse of news media articles on the 
Polish ‘constitutional crisis’ is structured around naturalised categories 
and value-laden structural oppositions that can be taken for granted in 
the interactive generation of meaning, and thus for consolidating 
assumptions and reinforcing opinions. While previous sections have 
highlighted how some of these categories and pairs operate in their 
textual context, below they are presented in a de-contextualized form. 
 
Table 1. A selection of oppositions occurring in newspaper articles on the 
Polish ‘constitutional crisis’. 
 
Positive Negative 
Polish Crisis Deepens as Judges Condemn Their Own Court (New York Times, 
05.07.2018) (Santora 2018) 
rule of law, the European Union 
nationalist government; increasingly 
authoritarian;  
post-communist hopes for 
democracy 
Soviet domination 
judicial independence; once-
impartial tribunal; a non-partisan 
group 
purge of the Supreme Court; politicized 
and dysfunctional; increasingly 
politicized; stacked with its own jurists; 
rigged 
A no-deal Brexit is our safest option to escape the EU police state – let’s go for 
it (The Telegraph, 08.02.2019) (Phillips 2019) 
liberty under the law 
the EU police state; a dark and insidious 
authoritarianism; backsliding into 
authoritarianism; the forces of 
conservatism and denial 
its constitution and Polish law; 
Independent courts; our legal 
integrity 
abuses of power; clamped down on the 
judiciary, press and civil rights; a steady 
collapse of the rule of law 
Poland must not slide further into illiberalism (Financial Times, 16.10.2019) 
(Financial Times 2019)  
western liberals; civil society; 
centrist fightback; cradle of 1989 
anti-communist uprisings; 
Western capitals; the centre-right 
Civic Platform 
illiberalism; Conservative nationalism; 
nationalist populism; Catholic-infused 
social conservatism; a form of one-party 
rule; its abrasive leader, Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski; illiberal quasi-
authoritarianism fostered by Mr. Orban; 
EU concerns over the rule of law 
neuter the constitutional court; 
contentious legal reforms; tinker with 
electoral rules 
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Law and Justice v law and justice (The Economist, 25.01.2020) (The Economist 
2020) 
concerns over the rule of law; a 
union made of laws 
sowing chaos; an expression from 
communist times: lex telefonica 
the European Commission; the 
ECJ; the Venice Commission 
the populist Law and Justice; Hungary’s 
ruling Fidesz Party 
politically tainted 
an independent jurists’ association; the 
independent-minded Supreme Court 
president 
If you think the U.S. is having a constitutional crisis, you should see what is 
happening in Poland (Washington Post, 25.01.2020) (Pech and Keleman) 
the European Commission has 
escalated its efforts to defend 
judicial independence;  
the PiS government has sought to exert 
control over judges;  
E.U. membership requires respect 
for the rule of law, including 
judicial independence. 
“a Soviet-style justice system” 
In Poland, the rule of law is under ever greater threat (Financial Times, 
09.02.2020) (Financial Times 2020) 
The EU is built on the rule of law 
Hungary’s nationalist government; PiS 
swiftly neutered Poland’s Constitutional 
Tribunal; chaos now threatens; 
Independent experts 
loyalist judges; attempts to cow the 
judiciary 
Poland’s leadership doesn’t need ‘Polexit’ it can undermine the EU from within 
(The Guardian, 10.03.2020) (Chapman 2020) 
liberal democracy 
The rightwing populist Law and Justice 
Party; the country’s rightwing leadership 
the fundamental values of the EU 
values typically associated with the far 
right; championing homophobia 
the rule of law in Poland and the 
EU 
capture of the judiciary; undermining the 
rule of law 
Poland’s Right-wing populists tested by close-run presidential race (The 
Telegraph, 29.06.2020) (Day 2020) 
centre-Right mayor of Warsaw populist Right-wing president 
outward looking; at ease with 
liberal values 
a defender of the “traditional family” 
repair relations with Brussels 
overhaul of the country’s judicial system; 
undermining the constitutional order 
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This is not to suggest that there is in all cases a strict, direct one-to-one 
correspondence between the positive and negative sides in the table 
rows. The authors structure their texts around a network of oppositions, 
and seek to convey meaning through strategies and techniques, but how 
this meaning is constructed is dependent on the interpretative skills and 
inclinations of readers. In other words, it falls to the reader to couple 
the oppositions latent in the text and form binary pairs in the process of 
interpretation. 
Since Laclau and Mouffe’s 1985 model lacks a clear account of 
the reader’s role in discursive practices, Fairclough and van Dijk can be 
called upon to plug the theoretical gap.  
Fairclough’s social theory of discourse, practice is comprised 
of three processes: production, distribution and consumption 
(Fairclough 1992: 71). In his terminology, texts “are made of forms 
which past discursive practice, condensed into conventions, has 
endowed with meaning potential”. This meaning potential is reduced 
by interpreters, who ascribe their selected meanings in the process of 
reading/interpretation (Fairclough 1992: 75). For Fairclough, both the 
production of meaning potential in texts and the ascription of meaning 
in interpretation are determined by social factors and contexts. Hence 
the forms that the authors of newspaper articles use to produce their 
meaning potential are determined by past discursive practice, but also 
by the collective nature of newspaper text production (Fairclough 1992: 
78). Teun A. van Dijk develops this further with his socio-cognitive 
context model of how context determines discursive communication, 
thus: 
The journalist writing an editorial at the same time may engage in 
institutional and political action, and does so as member of a media 
organization, as member of a professional group, and probably as a 
member of one or more ideological groups. When writing the editorial 
she thus not only instantiates a general activity of newspaper editors but 
also the social representations shared by the organization or groups she 
currently “identifies” with (van Dijk 2009: 80).  
The same goes for the consumption/interpretation of newspaper 
articles: how a reader processes the forms embodied in a text will 
depend on their social context (ideological leanings, socio-cultural 
groups, identities and identifications). The authors of newspaper 
articles are able to draw on this social context to make assumptions 
about their readers’ general knowledge and political leanings.  
Stephen Dersley: A Discourse Analysis of News Media Articles… 
22 
What is striking in the articles under consideration, however, is 
the regularity of the structural oppositions used, and across newspapers 
occupying varied and opposed positions on the political spectrum. This 
discursive regularity adds weight to the argument made in Section 1: 
that the positions articulated on Poland’s ‘constitutional crisis’ stake out 
and constitute a narrow discursive field. The regularities suggest that 
beneath the intense divisions of left vs. right, leave vs. remain, authors 
and readers are united in their antagonism towards a more fundamental 
enemy, which is depicted as illiberal populism that undermines the rule 
of law. 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s model, ‘discursive fixations’ function 
in a similar way to Fairclough’s ‘forms’, in the sense that they are 
regularities that are arrested or delimited from the surplus of meaning. 
Since in their conception meaning is always overdetermined, all 
identities and meanings are only ever partial: they are “the relative and 
precarious forms of fixation which accompany the establishment of a 
certain order” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 98). Thus, in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s 1985 model, rather than a theory of specific discourse 
production and consumption, the emphasis is on the precarious, 
unstable nature of discourses and the subject positions constituted 
within them. But if this abstract model is applied to concrete discourse, 
this entails that, as an articulatory practice, the writing of newspaper 
articles that address and participate in social antagonisms is dependent 
on rearticulation: as events unfold and other discourses continue and 
develop their articulations in response to them, the unstable frontiers of 
a discourse and discourse formation require incessant reconstitution and 
delimitation. Oppositions are continually reiterated in discursive 
confrontation, both in the process of text production and in the 
interpretative process of text consumption. If the notion of “discursive 
struggle” is taken seriously (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 6), then 
newspaper opinion pieces on social-political crises are involved in just 
such a struggle. Furthermore, if Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of 
hegemonic discourse is accepted, then the structural oppositions 
deployed in news media discourse have to be understood as reflecting 
deep-seated social antagonisms. 
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2.3. Direct confrontation and misrepresentation 
In addition to implicit structural oppositions and the strategy of 
immediate rebuttal, an article from the print edition of The Economist: 
‘Law and Justice v law and justice’, 25.01.2020, also employs the 
strategy of misrepresentation, and this is related to another typical 
feature of news media texts covering Poland’s ‘constitutional crisis’, 
namely a systemic avoidance of the issue of sovereignty. 
The Economist article focuses on the conflict between the 
Polish government, the Polish Supreme Court and the ECJ, following 
the Supreme Court’s request, in August 2019, for a preliminary ruling 
from the ECJ on the Polish government’s law creating a disciplinary 
chamber for the Court. While the first half of the article provides a 
summary of these complex developments, the second half presents the 
justifications put forward by the Polish government. Rather than 
analyzing these justifications in any degree of detail, each argument is 
followed by an immediate rebuttal. The first example: 
The government says it is being treated unfairly. Under EU treaties, 
says Andrzej Duda, the president, “Poland has the right to regulate its 
internal legal order.” The opposite is closer to the truth. The treaties 
oblige national courts to apply EU law and obey the ECJ. European 
officials and experts in EU law warn that if one country’s courts are 
politicised, others may stop accepting their rulings” (The Economist 
2020) (emphasis added). 
The rebuttal does not substantially address the claim made by the 
president: it merely asserts the opposite, before citing anonymous 
experts to put forward a conditional claim which: a) equates a country’s 
assertion of sovereignty over its own legal order with the politicization 
of its courts; b) draws on the unquestioned assumption that national 
courts are by default non-politicized; and c) suggests the possible 
negative consequences of such politicization to the efficacy of the ECJ. 
The argumentation is tangential in the most generous light; in the worst, 
it is an example of rhetorical obfuscation masquerading as balanced 
argument while clearly siding with EU interests.  
The Economist article proceeds to tackle three arguments 
ostensibly put forward by the Polish government in its ‘White Paper on 
the Reform of the Polish Judiciary’, which was presented to the 
President of the European Commission, in March 2018. In discursive 
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terms, this can be treated as an example of news media discourse 
engaging with an exterior discourse. The strategies employed in this 
confrontation are immediate rebuttal, suppression, misrepresentation 
and appeals to expertise.  
The rebuttal strategy is employed to present and dismiss the 
first government justification: 
One was that the courts had never been properly de-communised. 
Three decades after the transition, this seems dubious. The average 
judge is far too young to have served under the communist regime. The 
government undermined its own case in November by appointing to the 
constitutional court and elderly PiS lawmaker who had served as a 
notorious prosecutor for the old dictatorship” (The Economist 2020) 
(emphasis added). 
By focusing on “the average judge”, the rebuttal ignores the fact that 
the justification in the White Paper is focused on specific judges, and 
concludes by listing examples of the specific sentences that had been 
issued by judges now sitting on the Supreme Court when they had been 
sitting in the lower courts during the period of martial law (White Paper 
2018: 15-16).13  
This government justification is tackled more convincingly by 
Iustitia, the Polish Judges Association, in its ‘Response to the White 
Paper Compendium’, 16.03.2018. The Association acknowledges that 
there are indeed 6 Supreme Court judges who adjudicated in courts of 
lower instance during the period of martial law (1982-1983), out of a 
total staff of 93, but suggests that if they are to be accused of “unworthy 
conduct” and brought to justice, this would have to be done on the basis 
of “an individualized (criminal or disciplinary) appraisal”. Iustitia 
concludes that the Polish Government’s systemic reform of the 
Supreme Court resulting in “the dismissal of 40% of the judges is a 
completely disproportionate measure” (Iustitia 2018: §4). 
This response from Iustitia would have been available to the 
authors of the Economist article, with a modicum of research, since it 
was published on the association’s website, in English, 9 days after the 
publication of the Polish Government’s White Paper, and thus over 18 
months before the publication of the Economist article. And the 
 
13 References are to page numbers, rather than sections or paragraphs. The White Paper 
is organized into numbered paragraphs, but there is some text which is not numbered 
(e.g. in panels). 
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Economist article actually mentions Iustitia’s protest march which took 
place in January 2020.  
The validity of the second government justification is 
acknowledged, but then immediately rebutted by citing the opinions of 
anonymous judges: “Another argument is that cases take too long […] 
Backlogs are indeed long, but judges say the reforms will not shorten 
them. They have not added support staff or simplified procedures much” 
(emphasis added). Thus, the rebuttal acknowledges the validity of the 
justification but shifts to criticism of the remedy. 
The third and final “claim” that the Economist authors chose to 
focus on is not actually presented in the White Paper as a justification 
for the reforms, but is actually a response to the “European 
Commission’s Remarks against the backdrop of the Legal System in 
Poland and in other EU Member States”. Therein, Polish Government 
responds, point-by-point, to the Commission’s assertion that its reforms 
of the judiciary constitute a threat to the rule of law in Poland. 
Describing these arguments as one of the “three justifications for its 
reforms” simply misrepresents the Polish Government’s White Paper. 
In fact, the third justification offered by the Polish Government is that 
the reforms restore balance to the tripartite separation of powers. This 
far-reaching argument, involving issues of accountability, immunity 
and judicialization, is entirely ignored by The Economist. Needless to 
say, the argument is addressed in Iustitia’s ‘Response’ (§7). 
Nevertheless, The Economist asserts: 
A third claim is that the EU is biased against eastern European 
countries, since western ones also give governments some say in the 
judiciary. For example, in Germany, as in Poland, the president of the 
constitutional tribunal is picked by the government, and cases are heard 
by smaller panels of judges. But in Poland the court’s president gets to 
select the panels and can choose loyal PiS justices (Economist 2020, 
emphasis added). 
The use of the term “eastern European countries” sets off alarm bells, 
since by most accounts Poland is located in Central Europe, and a 
search of the White Paper reveals that at no point does the Polish 
Government complain of bias against “eastern European countries”, 
and neither is any mention is made of ‘western’ countries. Furthermore, 
the White Paper makes no reference to the president of the German 
Constitutional Tribunal being picked the government. In the White 
Paper, comparisons with Germany are made with regard to: the 
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regulations on “trainee judges”, or “a judge on probation” (38-39, 45-
48); the absence of a National Judiciary Council in Germany (54); the 
nomination of judges by commissions composed of politicians (64-66); 
and judicial self-governance (84). Thus, The Economist simply 
misrepresents the White Paper and ignores the key arguments put 
forward. 
What the White Paper does assert is that the government’s 
reforms are “are in harmony with long-standing standards in other 
European Union countries” (underlining and emphasis in the original) 
(25). The White Paper concedes that “Polish regulations are not an 
exact copy of the Spanish, British, German or French legislation”, but: 
It is completely natural for the legal regimes of specific EU Member 
States to differ. Such differences stem from distinctive national and 
legal identities, which are protected by the European Union’s treaty 
law. However, those differences are not significant enough (e.g. 
mechanism of appointing judicial members for the National Council of 
the Judiciary varies from Spanish system only in details) to warrant 
claims that solutions resembling regulations that have proved 
themselves in other EU countries for years (and that have never 
presented any threat to the rule of law) should violate the tripartite 
separation of powers in Poland (White Paper 2018: 25-26).  
The Polish Government’s arguments thus appeal to the respect for 
national identities enshrined in Article 4 of the Treaty on European 
Union – identities which are “inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional”; and insist that the EU Member States have 
“separate constitutional identities” (83). Ultimately, the White Paper is 
an assertion of national sovereignty, proposing that Article 4’s principle 
of respect for national identities should allow for “constitutional 
pluralism” (81):  
The right to introduce its own sovereign institutional solutions 
concerning the judiciary is a pillar of each national constitutional 
system in Europe. The Polish reforms of the judiciary implement this 
right – they have been carried out in a way that takes into account the 
need to remedy the defects of the domestic judicial system, and at the 
same time does not diverge in a significant way from solutions that are 
universally applied in the European Union countries” (White Paper 
2018: 83).  
The crucial issue of sovereignty is simply not addressed in The 
Economist article.  
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Instead, the misrepresented Polish government’s claim that the 
EU allows western governments to “have some say in the judiciary” is 
immediately rebutted with a reference to cherry-picking by Hungary, 
and then two “experts” are named in an appeal to expertise: Kim Lane 
Scheppele, to provide the term “Frankenstate”, which describes a state 
composed of borrowed institutions and solutions; and Kees Sterk, 
president of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, to 
assert that people with knowledge of the systems in Europe are not 
fooled by the action of the Polish Government. The main thrust of the 
argumentative strategy is then made explicit: “Such complex 
manoeuvres may fool lay people, but not the experts” (The Economist 
2020). 
Rather than misrepresenting and suppressing the Polish 
Government’s arguments, and rebutting them with superficial appeals 
to expertise, The Economist could have tackled the justifications openly 
and head-on. For example, in its response to the sovereignty assertion, 
Iustitia argued that the Polish Government’s reforms of the judiciary 
fall outside the autonomy protected by Article 4 of the Treaty on 
European Union.14 However, The Economist seems to assume that “lay 
people” are incapable of understanding such point-by-point 
argumentation and at the same time employs discursive strategies that 
make it more unlikely that “lay people” will access such arguments. The 
near-imperceptible blend of reporting and opinion-shaping contributes 
to the dumbing-down of an already narrow discursive field.15 
2.4. Internal discursive policing and the sovereignty 
taboo 
The Economist article discussed in the last section revealed the lengths 
some journalists will go to in order to avoid addressing the assertion of 
sovereignty in the Polish context. I would go as far as to assert that a 
 
14 “The assumption underlying the autonomy of constitutional identity is that the 
Member State itself abides by the principle of patere legem quam ipse fecisti, according 
to which an authority is bound by its own rules and, in particular, its own Constitution. 
Therefore, breaching one’s own constitutional rules is a denial of the principle of 
constitutional pluralism and its resulting decision-making autonomy” (Iustitia: §26). 
15 For another example of a refusal to engage with the Polish Government’s White 
Paper, see Zselyke Csasky’s article for Foreign Policy (Csasky 2018).  
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reluctance to discuss this issue is a systemic feature of news media 
discourse focused on the Polish crisis. 
This claim draws on Foucault’s notion of “discursive 
‘policing’” put forward in his 1970 Inaugural Lecture “The Order of 
Discourse” (Foucault 1981: 56-61). While Foucault preceded Laclau 
and Mouffe in defining discourse as a practice which employs the 
principle of exclusion to distinguish itself from other, exterior 
discourses, he also posited that discourses are practices constituted by 
procedures that impose internal constraints and exercise control of the 
discursive interior. Thus, scientific discourse is controlled by 
disciplines: internal principles that define what objects a given 
discourse can speak of; what a science can decide is true or false 
(Foucault 1981: 59-60).  
I suggest that the concept of internal discursive policing can be 
applied to news media discourse: there are certain topics and concepts 
that simply cannot be spoken of in this discourse, and in UK and US 
news media discourse that addresses the Polish ‘constitutional crisis’ 
evidence suggests that the concept of sovereignty is taboo. Even articles 
published by stridently pro-Brexit UK newspapers such as the 
Telegraph and Express tend to avoid the issue of national sovereignty 
when discussing Poland’s clashes with the European Commission, 
despite the fact that the UK’s sovereignty vis-à-vis the EU and the 
European Court of Human rights has been a defining and oft-discussed 
issue in articles focused on Brexit.  
As we have seen (1.1), Damien Phillips argued in his 2019 
Telegraph article that a no-deal Brexit was the best way for the UK to 
escape from the “EU police state” (Phillips 2019), and Poland and 
Hungary were depicted as extreme representatives of a growing 
authoritarian tendency. Thus, while urging the UK to protect its 
sovereign institutions, e.g. “We must […] shield our legal integrity from 
those EU states who are regressing into ever-deeper authoritarianism” 
(Phillips 2019), at no point does Phillips open the discursive space to 
allow consideration of the possibility that Poland’s actions may also 
viewed as attempt to shield its legal integrity from the EU. At a 
fundamental level, the sovereignty exercised through Brexit is cast as a 
reclamation of British liberty (“with liberty under the law as our guiding 
principle” (Phillips 2019)), which must be disassociated from illiberal 
assertions of sovereignty, to the point where the latter are not even 
acknowledged as having anything to do with sovereignty. 
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Support for this hypothesized sovereignty taboo is provided by 
two articles by Peter Foster, the Telegraph Europe Editor. The first, 
entitled ‘What would Brexit mean for British sovereignty?’, appeared 
on 08.06.2016, just over two weeks before the Brexit referendum. Here, 
Foster outlines why EU law has supremacy over UK law, comments on 
the extent of EU law, and then provides a balanced and cautious 
breakdown of “the key areas where the EU currently impinges on UK 
sovereignty and how much sovereignty the UK could reclaim if we 
voted to leave” (Foster 2016). He covers a range of areas, including 
agriculture, justice, trade and immigration. Rather than present a 
simplistic, buccaneering image of sovereignty, Foster acknowledges 
the complexity of the issue and treats it pragmatically, pointing out that 
the UK cedes sovereignty in certain areas for the benefits that are 
gained.  
Just over a year later, on 27.06.2017, the Telegraph published 
Foster’s ‘Poland’s constitutional crisis threatens to pull EU apart’. Here, 
Foster generally frames the Polish crisis as a challenge to “the EU’s 
integrationist ambitions” and focuses on the EU’s response. The article 
is divided into a series of 8 questions, 5 of which explicitly focus on the 
EU: So what is the EU doing about it? What’s so ‘nuclear’ about Article 
7? So is Article 7 an empty threat? So the EU will just stand idly by? So 
is there anything the EU can do? (Foster 2017). Only one section 
presents the crisis from the Polish perspective: So liberal democracy is 
dying in Poland? Foster’s answer:  
It’s not as simple as that. As a counterpoint it is worth noting that, 
contrary to the overwhelming Western media narrative, the ruling Law 
and Justice party’s reforms ideas are not, in themselves, necessarily 
anti-democratic if handled differently (Foster 2017). 
This is an intriguing stance. On the one hand, Foster recognizes there is 
a discursive hegemony that frames Poland’s reforms as anti-
democratic, but on the other hand stops short of allowing that these 
reforms may be part of a rejection of liberal democracy, though not 
democracy per se. For Foster, the Polish reforms of the judiciary, “if 
handled differently”, “if framed properly”, can be presented and viewed 
as democratic. In other words, the agency of the Polish government is 
reduced to framing the issue in a certain way, to convincing the EU that 
its reforms are similar the process of judicial appointments in “mature 
democracies” such as Germany, Norway and the US (Foster 2017). 
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When discussing the EU’s threat to trigger Article 7, Foster 
actually broaches the subject of sovereignty:  
The Commission wants to ‘act’, but by doing so it risks hitting the EU’s 
biggest nerve: to what extent should a supra-national body of dubious 
democratic legitimacy be able to intervene in the internal affairs of a 
member state? (Foster 2017). 
Here, sovereignty is revealed as the crux of the matter, but it is framed 
from the EU’s perspective, rather than from the perspective of the 
member state: the question is to what extent can the EU intervene, not 
to what extent can a member state assert its legal autonomy and 
integrity within the EU framework. 
In more centrist or left-leaning UK and US commentary the 
issue of sovereignty is regularly avoided through reference to ‘the rule 
of law’.  
In 1.1, we saw how Anabelle Chapman, in her Guardian article, 
reduced Law and Justice’s agenda to normalizing “values typically 
associated with the far right”, such as homophobia and xenophobia, and 
how this characterization is swiftly followed by the following claim: 
“And by undermining the rule of law, Warsaw is eroding one of the 
fundamental values that the EU was founded upon” (Chapman 2020). 
No effort is made to explore the Polish government’s agential 
motivations, which are simply depicted as reactionary and destructive. 
As the same time, the rule of law is both positioned as fundamental and 
left entirely unexplored.  
A similar strategy is employed in Joanna Berendt’s New York 
Times article ‘E.U. Court Rules Poland Must Suspend Disciplinary 
Panel for Judges’ 08.04.2020. This time, the word ‘sovereignty’ 
actually appears in the text, when the author quotes a Twitter statement 
from the Polish deputy justice minister, Sebastian Kaleta, who 
responded to the CJEU’s ruling as follows: “Today’s ruling is an act of 
usurpation violating Poland’s sovereignty”.16 The issue of sovereignty 
is not addressed elsewhere in the text. Instead, the author draws on a 
range of experts (three judges and one professor) and institutions that 
express their concerns: in their lengthy direct quotations, Judge 
Krystian Markiewicz, Professor Artur Nowak-Far and Judge Stanislaw 
Zablocki focus on “the rule of law”, “a community of law” and “the 
 
16 The original tweet: https://twitter.com/sjkaleta/status/1247813390426398721 
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values considered to be the foundation of European law”, respectively 
(Berendt 2020). 
In my view, this evasion of the issue of national soveriegnty is 
both perplexing and regrettable – as is explained in the Conclusion.  
3. Insights on the rule of law and sovereignty from 
Polish legal theory 
This section will explore three different positions expressed in Polish 
legal theory on the crisis. As was mentioned in 1.3, the primary aim 
here is to shed some light on the narrow range of positions articulated 
in the articles analysed in the previous sections.  
3.1. Ryszard Piotrowski’s legal constitutionalist 
approach 
Professor Ryszard Piotrowski’s essay ‘Judges and the Limits of 
Democratic Power in the Light of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland’, published in Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny in 
2018, provides a lucid account of the rule of law and sovereignty in the 
Polish system from the perspective of liberal-democratic constitutional 
theory. In essence, Piotrowski shows how the Polish system fits into the 
European system of treaties and institutions in which, following the 
horrors of nationalism experienced during the Second World War, the 
rule of law effectively places limits on national sovereignty, by curbing 
the power of the parliamentary majority. 
Piotrowski cites the Polish Constitution, its Preamble and a 
Constitutional Tribunal ruling to remind his readers that the 
Constitution itself posits the principle of “the inherent and inalienable 
dignity of the person” as the foundation of the system of the Republic 
of Poland and as the source of rights and freedoms. All other principles 
– e.g. a democratic state ruled by law, the separation of powers – are all 
subordinate to this founding principle. According to Piotrowski, this 
value does not derive from any legal act: human beings possess certain 
rights “simply by virtue of being born a human being”; rights which are 
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“not dependent on the will of the legislator” and thus lie beyond its 
reach (Piotrowski 2018: 215).  
This is the liberal component of liberal democracy: the rights of 
the individual are protected from the power of the demos. While the 
continental rule of law model, largely developed by German jurists in 
the 19th century, as the doctrine of Rechtsstaat, was designed to protect 
civil society and the individual from the power of the sovereign state, 
after the experience of National Socialism and fascism, and in particular 
with the unlimited power of the Nazi state as representative of the Volk, 
the post-war rule of law doctrine designed solutions to protect the 
individual from the potential abuses of democracy (Costa 2007: 123-
133; Piotrowski 2018: 222). One such solution was Hans Kelsen’s 
institution of constitutional courts, which are authorized to review 
legislation in terms of its compatibility with constitutions. 
Piotrowski emphasizes that in the system of the Republic of 
Poland, the judicial power is “the guardian of universal and timeless 
values”: it safeguards these values from the parliamentary majority and, 
furthermore, if parliament forgets these values in the legislative process, 
the judicial power is legitimized to make corrections (Piotrowski 2018: 
217). The Polish Constitution stipulates that the judicial power is a 
separate and independent power (Art. 173), and, according to 
Piotrowski, it assigns a specific role to the Constitutional Tribunal, 
namely that of guarding “the limits of national sovereignty” (Piotrowski 
2018: 222). Thus, crucially, in Piotrowski’s model, the Constitution 
limits national sovereignty, since it assigns sovereignty to the values 
upheld by the community of the European Union, and since the 
Constitutional Tribunal is endowed with the authority to review 
domestic legislation and international agreements in terms of their inter-
compatibility (Art. 188 Constitution RP), judges are “becoming the 
depositaries of the Nation’s sovereignty” and can represent the 
sovereign (Piotrowski 2018: 222). The increasing importance of the 
judiciary after European integration has entailed a corresponding 
decrease in the role of parliament, placing “the judge above the 
legislator” (Piotrowski 2018: 222). 
Thus, in Piotrowski’s account, the conflict between PiS and the 
judicial power boils down to issues of soveriegnty and legitimacy. 
Under the control of PiS, the legislative and executive powers, which 
derive their mandate to represent the will of the Nation from elections, 
are being employed in an attempt to wrest sovereignty from the 
guardianship of the judicial power and the values of the European 
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community (Piotrowski 2018: 223-4). The judicial power draws its 
independence and its legitimacy to represent the Nation from the 
Constitution (Piotrowski 2018: 223-4), which is an instrument of the 
rule of law; and therefore any interference with the independence of the 
judiciary by definition undermines the rule of law. 
Piotrowski’s essay articulates a position within the liberal-
democratic rule of law tradition of continental Europe, the discourse of 
which is now thoroughly institutionalized in the courts, treaties and 
jurisprudence of the European Union and the European legal order. This 
discourse defines itself as purposely designed to limit the legislative and 
executive powers. 
3.2. Paweł Bała and Adam Wielomski’s challenge to 
“liberal-democratic dogma” 
On 12 December 2015, Dr. Paweł Bała and Professor Adam Wielomski 
published an article Rzeczpospolita entitled “Lawyers on the 
Constitutional Tribunal Controversy: Who is the Guardian of the 
Constitution?”,17 which basically argued that the President of the 
Republic of Poland, rather than the judicial power, is the true guardian 
of the Polish Constitution. 
Bała and Wielomski’s argument is extrapolated from the 
presidential address given by President Andrzej Duda on 3 December 
2015, following the swearing in of five PiS nominated judges to the 
Constitutional Tribunal at a midnight ceremony on 2 December. The 
president’s words are used to reject the Rousseau-Montesquieu-Kelsen 
model of the rule of law (combining the general will, the separation of 
powers, and constitutional courts), with an alternative Rousseau-
Constant-Schmitt model (will of the people/Nation, direct delegation 
and the executive power as a Schmittian sovereign). 
The president’s statement “I was guided by the will of the 
newly elected Sejm, in which Poles put such great hope for the repair 
of the Republic of Poland” is read as asserting, implicitly, that the 
‘naród’ (people, nation) is sovereign, and that this sovereign has 
 
17 The original title: Prawnicy o sporze wokół TK: Kto jest obrońcą konstytucji? 
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delegated power to the Sejm (parliament). This leads to the following 
conclusion:  
In this vision, the will of the Nation stands above individual 
constitutional provisions. If the sovereign says ‘I want’, neither the 
Constitutional Tribunal, nor any other organ of the state can answer: 
‘You cannot, because your will is inconsistent with the constitution or 
laws’” (Bała and Wielomski 2015).  
This account of sovereignty is therefore fundamentally opposed to that 
presented by Piotrowski in 2018: it is suggested that the will of the 
people/Nation, expressed through parliament, cannot be constrained by 
either the Constitution or the judicial power. Once the will of the people 
is placed above the Constitution, the legitimacy of the judicial power is 
weakened, and when viewed through the Rousseauan notion of 
delegation, the Sejm is viewed as receiving its mandate directly from 
the people, and is thus a direct delegate, but “the judges of the 
constitutional court [...] are delegate of delegates” (Bała and Wielomski 
2015).  
The authors interpret the president’s claim to be “safeguarding 
the Constitution and the continuity of state power” to propose that the 
President is the true guardian of the Constitution, rather than the 
Constitutional Tribunal. They draw on Art. 126 (2) of the Constitution 
RP (“The President of the Republic shall ensure observance of the 
Constitution”) and Carl Schmitt’s constitutional theory to suggest that 
when President Duda told the Polish nation “In order to put an end to 
the unnecessary disputes undermining the authority of the key 
institutions of the Polish State […] I decided to take the oath from the 
judges […]”, he was acting as a Schmittian sovereign – the “custodian 
of institutionalized violence” who makes “political decisions supported 
by real political categories” (Bała and Wielomski 2015).  
Bała and Wielomski draw on Schmitt’s famous dictum that 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt 1985: 5) to 
suggest the essence of power lies with the President of the Republic, the 
commander of the armed forces, rather than with “deliberation, 
verdicts, court decisions” (Bała and Wielomski 2015). Like the Sejm, 
the president is also a direct delegate, but one to whom the Nation has 
conferred the power to defend the Republican form of government. 
In their concluding paragraphs, the authors make no bones 
about the conflict taking place between PiS and the judicial power: the 
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denial of the Constitutional Tribunal’s power to restrain the legislative 
power is an attack on the Kelsenist conception of the role of 
constitutional courts and, more broadly, on liberal democracy. 
However, Bała and Wielomski do not go as far as to assert that this 
attack on liberal democracy is an attack on democracy per se: “It is 
therefore a misunderstanding that the one who does not accept the 
vision of a ‘negative legislator’ automatically negates the essence of a 
democratic state ruled by law” (Bała and Wielomski 2015). Their 
suggestion is that a new “political system” could be emerging, one in 
which the will of the Nation-sovereign is directly represented by the 
legislative and executive powers.  
Since their text is a provocative newspaper article, Bała and 
Wielomski conclude with hints and leave many questions unanswered, 
not least of which is how their proposed political system – with the 
legislative and executive powers controlled by one political party and 
the president as guardian of the Constitution – would be compatible 
with the rule of law, if the essence of the rule of law is that power is 
restrained by law? And how could such a system be compatible with 
the legal order of the European Union? 
In discursive terms, it is significant that two Polish jurists felt 
comfortable with publicly invoking Carl Schmitt – the German jurist 
who notoriously supported the Nazi party and Hitler’s seizure of power 
in 1933 – to support their notion that power should be wrested from the 
judicial power and transferred to the executive. In this respect, Bała and 
Wielomski are by no means alone: the rehabilitation of Schmitt is a 
characteristic of theoretical-political discourse on both the right and left 
these days (see Mouffe 2005; Burns 2020), in the search for alternatives 
to liberal-democratic thought.18 
3.3. Adam Sulikowski’s critique of neutrality 
Professor Adam Sulikowski’s critique of the institution of 
constitutional courts, such as that made in “Constitution – System – 
Hegemony” (Sulikowski 2016), is grounded in an anti-Kelsenist stance 
which draws on Schmitt’s juristic theory and Chantal Mouffe’s revised 
 
18 On the issue of Schmitt and Polish legal theory see (Bunikowski 2018). 
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Schmittian concept of ‘the political’. Crucially, Sulikowski’s 
arguments come from a complex philosophical position which is 
decidedly left of centre.  
Sulikowski’s central thesis is that nothing escapes ‘the 
political’, especially judicial organs such as constitutional courts. The 
concept of ‘the political’ posits that the basis of social life is 
antagonism, organized around ‘the friend/enemy’ distinction (Schmitt 
1996: 26-27). According to both Schmitt and Mouffe, this antagonism 
is “ineradicable” (Mouffe 2005: 4-5); it is the ontological or existential 
antithesis at the heart of social life. Societies are viewed as being 
organized according to collective groupings, with the possibility of 
violence ever present. Peace and the operation of law require that this 
antagonism is sublimated and masked, but in emergency situations – 
the Schmittian exception – legal norms evaporate, and the contingent 
nature of the legal order and the identity of the true sovereign become 
apparent (Schmitt 1985: 12-13).  
The notions of contingency and hegemony are of particular 
importance for Sulikowski. Mouffe argues that every social order is the 
result of sedimented practices “that conceal the originary acts of their 
contingent political institution and which are taken for granted, as if 
they were self-grounded” (Mouffe 2005: 17). Thus, a social order 
appears to be entirely natural, necessary and inevitable, when in fact it 
is “the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices. 
[…] Things could always be otherwise and therefore every order is 
predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities” (Mouffe 2005: 18). 
This exclusion is the basis for hegemonic discourse. 
Sulikowski posits that “that the constitutional judiciary is an 
embodiment of Enlightenment bourgeois ideology based on a certain 
rationalistic/liberal set of assumptions about law” (Sulikowski 2016: 
253). In other words, rather than being paragons of impartiality and 
independence, constitutional courts are inherently and ineradicably 
mired in ‘the political’, though this fact generally escapes our attention 
or is forgotten. Constitutional courts employ the “juristic camouflage” 
of deductive argumentation and interpretative rules “to effectively mask 
the extra-legal motivations behind decisions” (Mouffe 2005: 256). 
These extra-legal motivations only become apparent when the 
legislative power attempts to introduce acts which conflict with the 
values upheld by the constitutional judiciary, or which are embodied in 
the constitution and its case law. Sulikowski cites the rulings 
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concerning the so-called abortion compromise (1997) and the lustration 
rulings (1998) (Sulikowski 2016: 258).19  
According to Sulikowski, when there is a stable consensus, the 
assumption that law is neutral is reinforced by the media and 
“apologetic scholarly discourses” (Sulikowski 2016: 258). Drawing on 
the perspective and terminology of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory, Sulikowski casts the constitutional courts as deploying empty 
signifiers, such as “freedom”, “equality” and “justice”, and filling them 
with content through hegemonic interventions. Thus, rather than the 
guardians of universal, timeless values, as Piotrowski would have it, the 
constitutional courts are “the guardians of the hegemonic power over 
the content of empty signifiers” (Sulikowski 2016: 260).  
The rise of populist movements, as an eruption of the 
existential, emotional antagonism animating the political, is therefore 
depicted – following Laclau and Mouffe – as a rejection of the liberal-
democratic discursive hegemony: its individualistic values, its 
institutions, and its legal order. And this rejection can be cast as arising 
from a perceived lack of democracy, rather than an attack on 
democracy. The populist identification of enemies “is usually 
accompanied by a sense of disillusionment and a lack of true democracy 
– the ritualised ‘acquis constitutionnel’ ceases to appear to certain social 
groups as something pure, non-ideological and objective, and begins to 
be seen as dominated by enemies or at best too tolerant for them” 
(Sulikowski 2016: 261).Thus, the attack on the Constitutional Tribunal 
and the judiciary in Poland can be viewed as grounded in a wholesale 
rejection of the rule of law ideology that enshrines these institutions as 
impartial and independent counterweights to the will of the majority 
(popular/pplebiscitary democracy). 
4. Conclusion  
It can be argued that Poland’s ‘constitutional crisis’ or ‘rule of law 
crisis’ is, at its heart, a sovereignty crisis. As I mentioned at the end of 
2.4, the fact that this aspect of the issue is evaded or suppressed is 
 
19 For an analysis of lustration in Poland, see “Polish lustration and the models of 
transitional justice” (Krotoszyński 2014). 
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somewhat perplexing. In both Anglo-American and continental 
constitutional theory, the concept of the rule of law is inseparable from 
conceptions of soveriegnty: the essence of the rule of law in all systems 
is that law is an instrument used to restrain the power of the sovereign 
(Costa 2007: 134-6). Through the statements of its representatives and 
in the justifications presented in its documents, the Polish government 
has explicitly sought to frame the crisis in terms of sovereignty, but 
English language news media articles have failed to respond to this. 
Whether one views the Polish government’s arguments as cynical or 
sincere, they need to be presented and addressed, not caricatured or 
suppressed. 
If the news media articles cited and discussed in Sections 1 and 
2 are mapped against the theoretical positions on the Polish 
‘constitutional crisis’ outlined in Section 3, they all, despite their 
divergences, fit inside the theoretical space staked out by Piotrowski’s 
article. In other words, they articulate positions firmly embedded within 
the discursive formation of liberal democracy. This, of course, is not to 
say that there is anything wrong with journalists articulating the values 
of liberal democracy. This practice becomes problematic, however, 
when these values are articulated with a lack of critical awareness or as 
part of a strategic simplification.  
When a crisis of great complexity is presented through taken-
for-granted, naturalized categories (e.g. invoking the concept of the rule 
of law without contextualization or elucidation, avoiding the related 
concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy), this amounts to doing readers 
a disservice. Rather than informing and persuading, such writing tends 
to misinform and manipulate, especially if other positions (i.e. based on 
assumptions and values other than those underpinning liberal 
democracy) are strategically caricatured, misrepresented or denied. 
News media discourse would greatly benefit from demonstrating a 
greater awareness of other, exterior discourses and developing a more 
generous and balanced approach to presenting and addressing their 
claims. 
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